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I. INTRODUCTION

Constitutions express our desire to build a better society in the
future. In Latin America, we are well acquainted with the idea that the
destiny of our societies depends in large part on having good
constitutions. It seems natural to us to link social progress to the
promulgation of a political constitution. However, though it may appear
obvious, the relationship between constitutions and social progress has
not always been a prominent one in the history of constitutionalism.'
Moreover, I would say that, when viewed worldwide, the opposite
vision has prevailed, under which the essential objective of the
constitution of a given country is to avoid abuses of power and to
protect the rights of citizens, not to serve as a step in the direction of
social progress. From this point of view, a constitution functions as a

* A shorter version of this Article was published in the Wisconsin International Law
Journal. Mauricio Garcia-Villegas, Law as Hope: Constitution and Social Change in Latin

America, 20 WIS. INT'LL.J. 353 (2002). I am grateful to Rodrigo Uprimny, Jonathan Graubart,Jane
Larson, Heinz Klug, Greg Shaffer, Joe Thome, Liliana Obregon, Carlos Gaviria, and Camilo
Sanchez for the valuable comments they provided on this Article.
** Professor at the Law School of the National University of Colombia in Bogota, fellow
of the Institute For Legal Studies - Law School University of Wisconsin and former Tinker
Visiting Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. See generally ULRICH K. PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE LINK BETWEEN
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PROGRESS (1995).
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legal document, which protects the inherent human rights people
possessed before political organizations existed.2 Our vision, however,
considers the constitution as a political, creative, and foundational
document that connects the origins of our society to its future. The
meaning of the constituent assembly, i.e., the act through which a
constitution is made, is different in the two cases: in the first, it is an
attempt to ratify - or in the worst case scenario to adjust or fix - a
political reality that exists thanks to, in general, a revolution which has
already been consolidated. In the second case, the constituent assembly
transforms a fixed social and political reality into a social revolution.
These two conceptions were debated in the middle of the eighteenth
century by Louis-Adrien Le Paige and Gabriel Bonnot de Mably. Le
Paige affirmed, in Lettres Historiques 3 that in France what existed was
a traditional monarchical constitution could stand in opposition to
ministerial despotism. Mably, conversely, in Observations sur 1'histoire
de France,4 affirmed the nonexistence of the constitution in France; he
maintained that France was dominated by a series of unstable changes
characterized by the succession of anarchic and despotic moments, and
that it was impossible to identify a connecting thread between these
events.
The debate between supporters of these two trends was
exceptionally intense at the beginning of the French Revolution.' On the
one hand were those who believed that the constitution responded to a
type of essence - the political soul - of society, an essence which had
existed since the origins of France. According to this perspective, in
times of crisis, like those which French society was experiencing at the
end of 1788, it was enough to simply adjust the existing constitution to
the new epoch. Part of this concept is found in Le serment du Jeu de
Paume of June 20, 1789, a document in which delegates promised not
to rest until they had "fixed" a new constitutional text for France.6 It
2. See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION (1946) (showing this conception).
3. See generally LOUIS-ADRIEN LE PAIGE, LETTRES HISTORIQUEs SUR LES FONCTIONS
ESSENTIELLES DU PARLEMENT (1753).
4. See generally GABRIEL BONNOT L 'ABBE DE MABLY, OBSERVATIONS SUR L'HISTOIRE DE
FRANCE (1765).
5. See Michael Baker, Constitution, in DICTIONNAIRE CRITIQUE DE LA RtVOLUTION

FRANCAISE 181 (Francois Furet & Mong Ozouf eds., 1992) (discussing this debate).
6. It is worth noting that there may be a third way of resolving this tension, which relies
mostly on the American Revolution. According to Hannah Arendt for example the constitution
must be understood as "the act of foundation." Here the two elements in tension, protection and
political will, merge. The constitution is the "deliberate attempt by a whole people at founding a
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was the monarchic delegates, however, who most vehemently defended
this idea of a constitution,7 an idea inspired by Aristotle and taken up
again by Montesquieu and the English jurists of the eighteenth century,
for whom the constitution was derived from the historical essence of a
people. Thus, this vision can be designated "essentialist," in that it
considers constitutional norms a response to the essence of the people.'
The second trend, in contrast, considered that a constitution could
only spring from the sovereign political will of the people. The drafting
of a constitution, from this viewpoint, was a voluntary act, which
created or renovated a new social reality in such a way that this act had
no bonds to the past, nor was it restricted by limits or conditions. In
contrast to the essentialist position, this vision can be designated
voluntarist in the sense that it vindicates a political, rational, and
universalistic truth against the concrete history and experience of a
society. Perhaps its most conspicuous representative was Jean Jacques
Rousseau, followed not only by Emanuel Sieyes and the majority of the
leaders from 1789 on, but also by such diverse writers as Karl Marx and
Carl Schmitt.
I use the term "aspirational constitutionalism" to refer to the
conception linked to Rousseau and this tradition of the French
revolution, which spread to Latin America at the end of the eighteenth
century and has prevailed ever since. I differentiate this type of
conception from the British view, which can be referred to as
"protective constitutionalism." I analyze, to begin with, some of the

new body politic." HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963). However, once the constitution is
enacted the popular will is immediately bound to it. The constitutional norm is supposed to embody
the will of the people from that moment on. This is why - according to Bruce Ackerman - it is
important to make a distinction between the origin of the constitution in which popular sovereignty
is at stake and ordinary politics in which the popular will withdraws to the benefits of the
constitution. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVoLUTION (1992).

7. According to the delegate Rhedon, "It is not a new institutional order which we should
create, but rather a simple declaration." ARCHIVES PARLAMENTAIRES DE 1780 A 1869, RECUEIL
COMPLET DES DEBATS LEGISLATIVES ET POLITIQUES DES CHAMBRES FRANCAISES 509 (Premiere

Series, 1789-1790).
8. In this manner, Montesquieu, in his pivotal work, Del Espiritu de las Leyes, linked
tradition to English conservatism and sustained that each people possessed its soul and essence, and
that norms could not deny this way of being of a people. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, DEL
EsPiRrru DE LAS LEYES (1972). "Laws in their broadest sense of meaning are the necessary
relations which are derived from the nature of things. In this way, all beings have their laws [... ].
Thus, there is an original logic. Laws are the relations which exist between this original logic and
that of different beings, and they are the relations between the different beings themselves. Id. vol.
I, ch. 1.
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characteristics of aspirational constitutionalism, and then outline some
benefits and risks of this conceptualization. Given the fact that
aspirational constitutionalism is very often embraced in Latin America,
I view it as a political reality that must be further analyzed. I endeavor
to show the complexity of the relation between constitutions and social
change and how this complexity is particularly challenging in the case
of aspirational constitutions.
My objective in this Article is to offer some useful sociological ideas
for constitutional design that might counter the type of constitutionalism
underpinning most of the judicial reforms that have been implemented
in Latin America over the last decade.' I develop my argument in two
parts. In the first, I attempt, from a sociological perspective, to
characterize aspirational constitutionalism. In the second, I attempt to
evaluate the risks present in this way of conceiving our constitutions.

II. CHARACTERIZING "ASPIRATIONAL" CONSTITUTIONALISM

Both aspirational and protective models of constitutionalism must be
understood as ideal types, and thus, it is difficult to find constitutions
which fall purely into one category or the other. Given this reservation,
I assert that the 1793 French Constitution and Colombia's current 1991
Constitution are good examples of aspirational constitutions. The U.S.
despite the foundational political philosophy that
Constitution inspired it - may, in contrast, be seen as an example of a protective
constitution.' 0 To illustrate more clearly these differences, in what
follows, I outline four sociolegal characteristics of what I am referring
to as aspirational constitutionalism.

9. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Ways ofConstitution-Making,in DEMOCRACY'S VICTOR AND CRISIS

(A. Hadenius ed., 1997);

see also JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

(Malcom Rowat et al. eds., 1995) (regarding judicial reforms in Latin America); Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, JudicialReform in Developing Countries and the Role of the World Bank, in JUDICIAL
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (1995); MARIA DAKOuAS, THE JUDICIAL SECTOR
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (1996); see Boaventura Santos, Derecho Y Democracia:
la Reforma Global de la Justicia, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA

(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Mauricio Garcia-Villegas eds., 2001) (giving a critical account).
10. According to Bernard Bailyn, "The primordial objective of the American Revolution ...
did not consist in the abolition of the existing social order, or even making changes to it, but rather
in preserving a political liberty that was threatened by manifest constitutional corruption and
ensuring the existing conditions of freedom." BERNARD BAILYN, Los ORIGENES IDEOL6GICOS DE
LA REVOLUCI6N NORTEAMERICANA 32 (1972).
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First, aspirational constitutions prosper, above all, in situations

where great present unrest and a strong belief in the possibility of a
better future exist. A good example of this was the promulgation of the
first two constitutions of the French Revolution, which were impelled
by the extreme condition of poverty and misery of the people of
France." This situation is characteristic of peripheral and semiperipheral societies. 2 Protective constitutions, on the other hand, stem
more from fear of a history of abuses that has supposedly been
overcome; consequently, they reflect an effort to secure the present.
Defense of this constitutional type is common in core countries, and
above all in those with Anglo-Saxon traditions. This tendency does not
exclude intermediary possibilities: protective constitutions or slightly
aspirational ones may be enacted in societies in which the present is not
particularly attractive, except to a dominant minority. The Colombian
Constitution of 1886 may be an example of this type. On the other hand,
in times of crisis or instability, aspirational constitutions might also
emerge in stable and developed countries." Examples include the
constitutions promoted in Germany and Italy after World War II, or in
post-Franco Spain.
Second, in contrast to the protective constitutions, which have
moderate and minimalist goals, aspirational constitutions are
maximalistic in their objectives. This maximal character is revealed in
the normative conception of positive rights (social rights) and
principles, and in its consequent promotion of judicial activism."

11. The ideas of hunger, famine, and basic needs were determinant in the political
development of the French revolution. This explains Robespierre's famous statement: "everything
which is necessary to maintain life must be common good and only the surplus can be recognized
as private property." MAXIMILEN ROBESPIERRE, OEUVRES 514 (1970).
12. See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, REINVENTAR A DEMOCRACiA (1998) (explaining

semi-peripheral societies). Cass Sunstein maintains that there are two kinds of constitutionalisms:
one from the north and the west, and the other from the south and the east of the world. Cass
Sunstein, The Negative Constitution:Transitionin LatinAmerica, in TRANSrITON TO DEMOCRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY (I.P. Stotzky ed., 1993).
13. This is why Teitel suggests that "In its ordinary social function, law provides order and
stability, but in extraordinary periods of political upheaval, law maintains order, even as it enables
transformation." Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political
Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009-80 (1997).
14. Nevertheless, this characteristic should be approached with caution, given that the
objective of this type of constitutionalism is to create a pluralist and tolerant society that excludes
static and unchangeable models of society and life. GUSTAVE ZAGREBELZKI, IL DIRIT7O MITE
(1992). In this sense, emphasis is placed more on procedures than on content, specifically on the
procedures required to achieve coexistence amongst 'people holding different world views.
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Whereas in protective constitutions, positive rights are treated as
political matters, which are decided in parliament, in aspirational
constitutions this is also, and some times mainly, a judicial question.
Judges are allowed to protect social rights even when the parliament has
enacted specific legislation that, according to a judge or a court, has not
been effective in protecting those positive rights." This entails a
politicization of the judicial practice, which is usually called judicial
activism. The protection of positive rights rather than formal ones is a
substantive protection, that is, a protection based on material results.
Given that within this type of constitution the protection of rights must
be substantial and effective, important inter-institutional conflicts might
arise, between, on the one hand, state organisms defining or disbursing
the national budget - legislative or administrative - and, on the other
hand, constitutional judges in charge of protecting rights that depend on
channeling that budget.
Third, the effective application of aspirational constitutions requires
something beyond their simple legal or judicial development; in

general, it requires actions carried out by public officials beyond what is
postulated in the text. The legal or judicial development of these
constitutions is a necessary condition of their proper functioning, but it
is insufficient. In order to achieve their stated goals, these constitutions
need at least two external sources of support outside of the state
bureaucracy implementing constitutional mandates. They require

15. A difference can be established between two traditions of constitutional law in Europe
after World War II: first, the rule of law tradition, also named etat de droit or rechsstaat, and
second what is called the social state of law adopted in Germany in 1948 or Spain in 1978. The
most essential characteristic of the latter consists, according to G. Zagrebelzky, in the separation
of rights and the legislation. The protection of rights - in contrast to the French tradition - does
not depend exclusively on the law made by parliament, but rather on the judicial sanction by the
constitution. This separation allows the judges, in certain cases, to directly apply constitutional text
to protect rights, even when a legal disposition exists that points to a solution different from the one
contemplated by the constitution. See id. at 57. But the topic of social rights is not limited to the
national context. Adrian C.M. De-Kok, Will Lack of Commitment to Fundamental Social Rights
Persistin Europe after 1992?, 10 INT'LJ. SOC. & Soc. POL'Y 81-84 (1990); Antonio Baldassarre,
Los Derechos Sociales, REVISTA DERECHO DEL ESTADo 5 (1998) (studying the relation between

international and national protection of social rights from the European context); see Ernest W.
Bockenforde, Los Derechos Fundamentales Sociales en la Estructura de ta Constitucion, in
ESCRITOSDE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (1993), cited in Rodolfo Arango, Los DerechosSociales
Fundamentales Como Derechos Subjetivos, PENSAMIENTO JURIDICO 8 (1997) (critiquing this
"maximalistic" constitutionalism). Robert Nozick views social rights from a liberal perspective of
a minimalistic state. See Otfried Hoffe, Social Rights as Opposed to the Minimal State: A
PhilosophicalExploration, 8 LAB. & Soc. 179-94 (1983) (regarding Nozick's position).
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something that I will term, paraphrasing Donald Komners' concept of
"militant democracy," militant constitutionalism. By this I mean that
they require permanent commitment from the political forces that
brought them about. To be efficacious, aspirational constitutions must
face the institutional difficulties that originate in the judicial protection
of social rights with the support of the aforementioned political forces. 6
Without these, the aspirational constitutions - and in some occasions
constitutional courts - can be subjected to multiple attacks that may
end up moderating judicial interpretations, or, in the worst case
scenario, producing constitutional amendments. In addition, aspirational
constitutions need to create a new legal culture of protection of rights.
This new culture must be brought about through both the
implementation of a new legal education in law schools and the
elaboration of a new legal doctrine, particularly a judicial legal doctrine,
that favors social change.' 7
Fourth, aspirational constitutions are characterized by a huge gap
between their normative objectives and the social realities they regulate.
This is rooted in their futuristic nature and it explains why maximalistic

constitutionalism prospers most readily in places where only minimal
legal protection exists. This paradox can be explained by the political
fact that societies experiencing the greatest degree of need generally
adopt the most pretentious constitutions. The fact that maximalist
constitutions are often adopted in those societies where not even the
minimal and more essential constitutional provisions are effective is a
disturbing paradox for an aspirational constitutionalism. This is why
they must always find a solution - either legal or political - to the
problem of inefficient constitutional norms.
The characteristics mentioned above bring to the forefront the
difficult challenges which aspirational constitutions confront. These
difficulties can have beneficial but also counterproductive
consequences. In what follows, I outline these in terms of benefits and
risks. It is important to bear in mind that they are connected to what I
termed militant constitutionalism. Benefits are likely to accrue in
situations in which there is a strong commitment by the political forces
that bring about the constitution. Conversely, risks are more likely in

16. Aspirational constitutions bring about a scenario in which majorities must undertake
counteractions in order to force legislators to accept social rights.
17. See generally Rodrigo Uprimny, JusticiaConstitucional,DerechosSociales YEconomia:
Un Andlisis Tedrico Y Una Discusidn De Las Sentencias De Upac, 13 PENSAMIENTO JURiDICO
(2000).
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countries in which a militant constitutionalism has not been developed
after the promulgation of the new constitution.
A. Benefits
First, aspirational constitutions keep alive a political conscience of
social change, which is important in societies where the current social
and political situation is considered unacceptable. Constitutions based
on protective or conservative goals would have little meaning in
contexts where what needs changing far surpasses what needs to be
maintained. Moreover, a protective constitution promoted in such a
social context might become highly suspect given the probability that it
is supported by a governing minority that benefits from conserving the
present state of affairs. In short, aspirational constitutionalism might be
embraced in semi-peripheral countries to the extent that a democratic
process is adopted in the configuration and functioning of the
constituent assembly.18
Second, it is to be expected that these constitutions will not be
reduced to a mere set of symbolic progressive norms. All constitutions,

even those most characterized by aspirations, must produce some
degree of immediate effects. The enactment of a new constitution
produces a new political environment, at a minimum, which cannot be
maintained without some immediate social or institutional changes. The
rhetoric of progressive legal changes has limits that derive from the
need authorities have in bringing about minimal real changes to keep
alive the political consciousness of legitimacy sought by the reform. An
aspirational constitutionalism will not be able to sustain itself if it does
not produce quick and effective changes.' 9
Third, and linked to the previous two points, it would seem that, at
least in some cases, aspirational constitutions create a strong symbolic
connection between the constitutional text and at least some grass-roots
leaders, who find in the constitution a political banner that inspires them

18. Jon Elster emphasizes the relation between democratic process of adoption and the
democratic structure of the constitution so being adopted. Elster, supra note 9, at 125.
19. The Colombian Constitution may be a good example. Since the promulgation ofthe 1991
Constitution, the protection of fundamental rights in Colombia has certainly improved from the pre1991 context. However it may not have risen to the expectations included in the text itself. This is
thanks to the "acci6n de tutela" (writ of protection). See Uprimny, supra note 17; Mauricio GarciaVillegas, La Accidn de Tutela, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA, supra note 9;
MAURICIO GARCIA-VILLEGAS, LA EFICACIA SIMB6LICA DEL DERECHO; ANALISIS DE SITUACIONES
COLOMBIANAS (1993).
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to use legal strategies to vindicate rights. This is important in Latin
American countries where political systems, and particularly political
representation, function poorly. In Colombia, for instance, some of the
most progressive rulings of the constitutional court were taken within
social movements as political symbols, bearing a message of hope and
social emancipation that reactivated political energy among social

actors. Under certain circumstances, 20 courts can give rise to social
practices of emancipation to the extent that they may both facilitate

political consciousness among excluded social groups and provide
possible strategies for legal and political action that could remedy their
situation." In such cases, a court's rulings acquire an important
constitutive dimension by virtue of which they create, help to create,
and strengthen the identity of political subjects. This is especially clear
with regard to the so-called New Social Movements that vindicate rights
associated with gender, culture and identity."
B. Risks
In the first place, aspirational constitutionalism gives rise to

exaggerated hopes concerning the capability of constitutions and states
to carry out social change. This fact both obscures and reduces the role
and capacity that society, individuals and social movements have to
determine their own destiny. There is a state-centered voluntarism very
common to the French and Latin American traditions that spread
throughout Latin America producing "strong" states and weak civil
societies." Where social classes and conflicts between classes are
20. Uprimny, supra note 17.
21. This general analysis coincides with analyses on this topic from countries in the center.
Michael W. McCann, Resurrection and Reform: Perspectives on Property in the American

Constitutional Tradition, 13 POL. & SOC. 143-76 (1984); Stuart Scheingold, The Constitutional
Rights and Social Change: Civil Rights in Perspective, in JUDGING THE CONSTITUTION: CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING (Michael W. McCann & Gerald L. Houseman eds., 1989).
22. RODRIGO UPRIMNY & MAURICIO GARCiA-VILLEGAS,
EMANCIPACION SOCIAL EN COLOMBIA (2000).

CORTE CONSTTUCIONAL Y

23. However it is important to notice that states in Latin America possess an apparent legal,
and at times military, strength that contrasts with their real political or hegemonic weakness. The
factors that make its centrality possible, explains Santos, are also those that cause its inefficacy.
SANTOS, supra note 12. The internal heterogeneity of the private and productive spheres create
relative autonomies in each, the effect of which is the blocking, subversion, transformation, or
appropriation of state functioning. Id. The primacy of the political - the public sphere of
citizenship - coexists with its dependency in relation to other structural spaces of power. Under
these conditions, the form of state power, that is, domination, is exercised in practice in complex
combination with other forms of power characteristic of other structural spaces. Id.
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historically strong - for example in Great Britain - democracy has
obtained greater stability. On the contrary, as Alain Touraine suggests,
in cases where the state becomes the main agent of modernization

for example in France or Latin America - democracy has always been
weak, and it has been carried away by political action to the detriment
of social transformations. 24 Perhaps the lessons that Alexis de
Tocqueville teaches about democracy are useful: multiple associations
that serve as buffers or filters existing between the state and the people
are beneficial."
The second problem is rooted in the fact that the aspirational

conception of constitution brings about an almost permanent condition
of legal reformism. All political leaders thus want to carry out
constitutional reforms with the objective of obtaining the ensuing
benefits of political legitimacy. Latin America has been a victim of this
practice more than any other region in the world. 26 Here, constitutional
reformism has become the expression that fills the deficit of
governmental political maneuverability. The more limited the Latin
American governments' margin of political maneuverability is - and
the less operative representative democracy - the greater the need to
turn to the law to respond to social demands.2 7 In these circumstances of

precarious hegemony and absence of socially rooted political parties,
the production of law becomes a substitute for the political system,
establishing a certain communication between the state and its
associates. Said another way, the legal system becomes more a
mechanism devoted to the legitimization of public policies than a tool
for the instrumental implementation of these policies. In these critical
contexts, the production and implementation of law yields to a
reconstruction of social problems and a political escape towards ground
24. ALAIN ToURAINE, WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? (David Macy trans., 1997).
25. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, EL ANTIGUO RtGIMEN Y LA REVOLUCION (1972); Alexis de
Tocqueville, Editorial, La Revolucion En Amirica, ALIANZA (Madrid) (1980).
26. This practice is associated with the political uses of the symbolic efficacy of law. See
GARCIA-VILLEGAS, supra note 19. These practices tend to be adopted as a means of solving
conflicts that cannot be solved through the political system. It is also related to the type of
agreement that can be reached in societies characterized by extreme heterogeneity in terms of class
and culture: the more social homogeneity exists the more likely it is to have specific and efficacious
agreement. Conversely, the greater social heterogeneity the more likely the adoption of symbolic
and general agreement.
27. This phenomenon has been studied in other settings. See FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ, LA
CIUDAD REPRESENTADA, POLITICA Y CoNFUCTo EN BOGOTA (1998); Malcom Deas, Violent
Exchanges: Reflections on Political Violence in Colombia, in THE LEGITIMATION OF VIOLENCE,
(D. Apter ed., 1977) (showing the importance of the use of law in Colombian institutional life).
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on which governments can get more advantages or simply attenuate the

pernicious effects of their political incapacity.28 There is an attempt to
partially compensate the legitimacy shortfall, derived from and at the
same time caused by the state's instrumental inefficacy, by increasing
communication through the production of law and legal discourse as

responses

to

social

demands

for

security,

social justice

and

participation. 29
The third problem consists in the fact that aspirational constitutions
can lead to a devaluation of the rule of law. Overestimated expectations
bring with them a certain negligent attitude toward the present and an
exaggerated effort to obtain things in the future; this translates into the
idea that politics and not law (or rather the legal arena in its merely

political expression) is the only thing that matters. This is linked to the
type of law prevailing in Latin America, which is characterized by an
enormous flexibility. The application of the constitution is less focused

on the judicial enforcement of rights than on political programs that
cannot be controlled in the arena of public administration. This
flexibility is reinforced by the unpredictable and pressing nature of the
modern world and of public administration. 30 In Latin Anierica, legal
flexibility stems from the colonial era, when the norms created by Spain
were molded and adapted to the local realities by colonial authorities,
and it has been reproduced by the nineteenth century republics, which
were incapable of creating a culture of citizenship based on the
protection of individuals through legal rights. This culture could have
confronted the prevailing culture of private protection through family
relations, status, clientelism, and patronage. 31 Referring to Brasil,
Roberto Da Matta explains how individuals defend themselves and

28. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964) (showing the symbolic
construction of social problems). More recently, in organizational theory it has been shown that
institutions respond to social problems in such a way that the aims of legitimization and
communication predominate over carrying out the proposed objectives. See MICHEL CROZIER,
L'ACTEUR ET LE SYSTAME (1977); see, e.g., PAUL DI-MAGGIO & WALTER POWELL, THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (1991) (regarding schools dubbed new
institutionalism); JOSE EDUARDO FARIA, EFICACIA JURIDICA E VIOLENCIA SIMBOLICA: O DIREITO

COMO INSTRUMENTO DE TRANSFORMACAO SOCIAL (1988) (showing the concept of symbolic
efficacy in Latin American legal settings); see also GARCiA-VILLEGAS, supra note 19; MARCELO
NEVES, A CONSTITUCIONALIZACAO SIMBOLICA (1994).
29. See FARIA, supra note 28.

30. See Francois Ost, Temporal PluralismandLegal Relativism: Contributionto the Study
of De-Legalization, in LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY: COMPARATIVE AND
CRITICAL APPROACH (T. Daintith ed., 1988).
31. See MAURICIO GARCIA-VILLEGAS, DERECHO Y SOCIEDAD EN AMtRICA LATINA (2003).
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make their will prevail against the universal law, not by using another
universal law, but through personal relationships. This allows the
breaking of an abstract and impersonal law, contrasted to reality and

reasonableness in individual cases. 32 It is from this context that the
Latin American countries derive their practice of legal exceptionalism

in the institutional and social arenas.
C. Restrictive Constitutionalism
Aspirational constitutionalism is far from being something that has
gained calm acceptance by the different political factions operating in
Latin America. At the moment, its main opponents take inspiration
from the economic theories of law, particularly in two currents of
thought that have been highly influential in recent decades in the United
States: Law and Economics," and the neo-institutionalist school of
economics.34 Despite the diversity of authors and perspectives
represented in these movements, all of them share one central idea

about constitutional law: economic resources should be exploited in
such a way so as to produce the maximization of human satisfaction,
measured by the aggregate will of consumers to pay for goods and
services.3 5 According to this conceptualization, constitutional judges
must render decisions according to a principle of wealth
maximization. 36 Market efficiency, in this view, becomes the legitimate

32. Roberto Da Matta, The Questfor Citizenship in a Relational Universe, in STATE AND
SOCIETY IN BRAZIL (John D. Wirth et al. eds., 1987).
33. The law and economics movement originated in the 1960s with the pioneering work of
Ronald Coase in which the concept of transaction costs is analyzed. Ronald Coase, The Problem
ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1-44 (1960). This text was followed by two influential publications
including a book by Guido Calabresi on economic analysis of civil responsibility and Posner's
famous "Economic Analysis of Law." GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1992).

34. New institutionalism argues that there is a reciprocal influence between economic
behavior and institutional environment which entails a critique of the liberal conception of an
efficient and self-sufficient market. Its most distinguished spokesperson is Douglass North.
DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUCIONES, CAMBIO INSTITUCIONAL Y COMPORTAMIENTO ECONOMICO
(1993).
35. POSNER, supra note 33, at 10.
36. Id. at 37. These postulates were adopted by the first generation of law and economics
theorists. These days, however, although most advocates consider that the analysis in terms of
efficiency is useful to evaluate the way that judges should rule, the majority rejects the idea that the
notion of efficiency is the only important factor. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, CognitiveImperfections
and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 385 (1989).
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parameter to revolve tensions among fundamental rights." Just and
correct judicial decisions, then, are those that reduce business costs
and that, therefore, increase
avoiding redistributive pressures wealth. 38
For their Latin American proponents, these ideas serve to strike at
the heart of aspirational constitutionalism and, in particular, the notion
it espouses of social rights as actionable rights. According to them, the
enshrinement of social rights in the constitution has only a symbolic
character or, in the best scenario, a programmatic one. Aspirational
constitutionalism, by questioning and making property rights and
classical liberal rights uncertain, ends up operating against the market,
development and in the last instance, equity. 39 The only viable way that
social rights can be established, in this view, is for a legislator, through
a democratic debate, to decide that sufficient resources are in place for
the state to commit itself to protect them. These ideas have produced a

new model of constitutionalism that can be termed "restrictive
constitutionalism." Its can be differentiated not only from aspirational
constitutionalism but also from protective constitutionalism.
The constitutional court in Colombia, for instance, has defended the
position that social rights can be protected by judges in an indirect
fashion. The constitutional court differentiates, therefore, between
fundamental rights and others, such as social rights, which can only be
protected through their connection with the former. For a social right to
be protected, it is necessary that the lack of protection invoked in court
implies that another right, considered fundamental and of immediate
application, is affected, such as the right to life, to health, or to human

dignity.
The reaction of the supporters of restrictive constitutionalism in
Colombia was not long in coming. Sergio Clavijo has argued insistently
that the most efficient model for political decisions is the classic one of
the division of powers, understood as the separation and differentiation

37. Such tensions are very common, especially in constitutional law, such as between the
right to freedom of private enterprise and environmental rights, or between labor rights and
property rights. See Uprimny, supra note 17.
38. The law and economics movement can be seen as a conservative reaction to the legal
activism of the Warren Court's decisions.
39. That is, for example, the opinion of Kugler and Rosenthal as well as that of Alberto
Carrasquilla. See, e.g., MAURICE KUGLER & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, DIVSION DE PODERES: UNA
ESTIMACION DE LA SEPARACI6N INSTITUCIONAL DE LOS PODERES POLITICOS EN COLOMBIA (2000);

Alberto Carrasquilla,EconomlayConstitucidn:Haciaun Enfoque Estratigico,DERECHoP0BLICO
(Uniandes - BogotA) 12 (2001).
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of the powers - not reciprocal control - just as French legal tradition
emanating from the French Revolution of 1789 conceived of it. The big
problem with the 1991 Colombian Constitution is that it takes sides on
the question of the definition of economic differences to the detriment
of the Congress. 40 Likewise, Hugo Palacios Mejia argues that the big
problem of the constitutional court is that in its "tropicalism," it takes
decisions that "cause Colombian society to be inefficient"; that is, all
Colombians obtain fewer goods and services than they would have, had
the constitutional court not intervened or intervened in another way.41
Salom6n Kalmanovitz, for his part, is alarmed that contracts are not

fulfilled in Colombia and that deceit flourishes. Meanwhile, justice,
"which ought to be the guarantor of property rights and contracts, is
putting these same contracts signed among citizens into jeopardy. This
leads to opportunistic behavior on the part of many actors and therefore
to extremely high transaction costs, which operate as a heavy burden on
future economic growth."4 2 According to this perspective, reforms
should be undertaken aiming to improve juridical security, which
implies constitutional guarantees for property and economic freedom, as
well as stable legal rules that will not be affected by populist or socialist
impulses.
But these are not the only kind of constitutional reforms that are
important. The principle of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences
in the application of law leads to a reform that, in addition to
eliminating legal activitism in terms of social rights, makes changes in
the penal system with the aim of increasing sentences and reducing
impunity. Economic agents have to be protected both in terms of their
persons as well as their property, which demands that the criminal

justice system control manifestations of violence and avoid attacks on
property and physical integrity. The strengthening of the penal system is
then a priority, above all, in countries like Colombia where so much
insecurity exists. The exclusion of social rights and the toughening of
criminal law sets up a state that promotes inequality in economic areas
and authoritarianism in criminal matters.

40. SERGIO CLAVUO, FALLAS Y FALLOS DE LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL (2001).
41. EL CONTROL CONSTITUCIONAL EN EL TROPICO, PRECEDENTE: ANUARIO JURIDICO (Hugo
Palacios Mejia ed., 2001).
42. SALOMON KALMANOVITz, LAS INSTITUCIONES Y EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO EN
COLOMBIA (2001).
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D. Re-Thinking the Concept of AspirationalConstitutionalismfrom the
Colombian Case
Given these benefits and risks, which have been outlined abstractly,
it is difficult to render a final verdict regarding the value of the
aspirational constitutionalism and its constitutional courts. It is
necessary to examine a specific case and, from the variety of cases from
which to choose, the Colombian one is particularly interesting. In what
follows, I will present first how aspirational constitutionalism has
fulfilled some of its purposes through the constitutional court. Then, I
will temper this rather optimistic account with a more contextual
explanation about the social context in which the constitutional court
operates. In doing so, I hope to render clear how deeply interconnected
constitutions and their social realities are.
The - classification I have proposed between aspirational
constitutionalism and protective constitutionalism, while it might help
to improve our analyses about the success or failure of constitutions, is
an insufficient basis for definitive verdicts in this area. Constitutions,
whether they are based on aspirations or not, depend mostly on a series
of factors outside of their own domain. It is important to avoid
instrumentalist legal visions according to which legal norms are tools
that can change social reality simply through articulating proposals.
However, it is also important to be wary of materialist economist
visions that consider the law, and particularly constitutional law, to be a
mere derivative of economic relations. 43 Generally speaking,
constitutions can change many aspects of social reality, but whether
they achieve these changes or not depends largely on the fact that such
reality fulfills certain factual conditions that allow efficacious
implementation.4 4
Social change through the law is the result of a complicated formula
in which law is only one in an important set of components or
conditions that must be accomplished. In the case of aspirational

constitutions, these conditions become much more onerous, given the

43. This used to be the prevailing view in critical legal studies. See Morton J. Horwitz,
Rights, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393 (1990); see also Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62
TEx. L. REv. 1363 (1984); Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of
Opportunity:A CriticalLegal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988).
44. A similar argument was made by Carlos Nino that the corporative political power must
be defeated in Latin America in order to consolidate democracy. Carlos Santiago Nino, Transition
to Democracy, Corporatismand Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV.
129-64 (1989).
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enormous resistance that such fundamental social changes expressed in
the constitution can expect to encounter in their enforcement. The
bigger the aspirations, the harder the social conditions needed to
achieve those goals become. The very desire for these changes stems
from the existence of problems that are serious and pervasive, and for
which solutions are not always readily available. Even if solutions are
available, they are frequently linked to bringing about reforms in
difficult areas such as economic structure, culture and globalization.
The Colombian Constitution of 1991 illustrates this difficulty. The
social and institutional context in which it has been applied has proved
largely unfavorable to the fulfillment of its expectations. Institutional
stability, state weakness, and violence coexist in paradoxical ways in
Colombia. Up until the 1970s, three elements converge to explain
Colombian institutional stability. The first element is effective, albeit
relatively decentralized, mechanisms of control of the population,
represented paradigmatically by the institutionalization of bipartisan
power-sharing between the late 1950s and the early 1970s under the socalled Frente Nacional (National Front). Second, we find a great
cohesion among the sectors of the ruling class, notwithstanding their
partisan divisions. Third, there are functioning mechanisms of
articulation of interests among factions of the ruling class wherein the
state as an autonomous power plays a minimal role. The joint effect of
these elements has given rise to a precarious state subject to cooptation
and control by the ruling class, and, at the same time, to relative
political stability, given the hegemonic consensus within the ruling
class and the control over the subaltern classes. In addition, the above
elements help explain the absence of sudden turns in Colombian
politics, as social conflicts do not play themselves out in the political
arena. Stability, however, is achieved at a high cost, i.e., that of the
dramatic separation between the political and the social. The political
sphere does not function as a field of mediation for social conflicts,
which are thus solved by other, often violent, means.
Since the end of the 1970s, such paradoxical stability has been
affected by multiple factors. First, the erosion of the Catholic Church's
ideological and political leverage and of the population's political
loyalty to the traditional parties, as well as urbanization and an
incremental increase in education levels, undermined the effectiveness
of the traditional mechanisms of dominance. It did so by eroding the
ideological context that sustained the legitimacy of partisan divisions,
which conferred a natural appearance to social inequalities.
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Second, during the 1970s, the military gained greater autonomy in
controlling public order and considerably increased its influence on the
state apparatus, thus accentuating the fragmentation of the political
regime. Indeed, according to some analysts, one of the reasons for
Colombian political stability, especially during the period of the
National Front that started in 1958, was the "partitioning of the state
among the dominant agents." 45 This sought to avoid conflicts within the
different factions in power, assuring the most powerful social
contenders the control of a predetermined state parcel, i.e., public
administration to the liberal and conservative parties, the economy to
the business associations, and public order to the military.
Unsurprisingly, this distribution has tended to translate itself into
growing institutional fragmentation.
Third, the guerilla movements, which had ebbed in the early 1970s,
considerably increased their bellicose and territorial presence during the
1980s and 1990s. This increase was accompanied by the development
of the guerra sucia (dirty war), associated with the emergence of
paramilitary groups. Drawing on the complicity of sectors of the
military and the support of large landowners and drug traffickers, these
spread across vast spans of the Colombian territory. While ostensibly
pretending to combat the guerillas by undermining their social support,
the paramilitary groups' actions affect large sectors of civil society and
give rise to gross violations of human rights. Given these
circumstances, the Colombian state, which never truly achieved control
of its territory, nor effectively monopolized the exercise of coercion, is
now being confronted by powerful, armed actors, with which it has very
complex relationships of confrontation, dialogue and even cooperation.
Therefore, the population finds itself in the crossfire of the diverse
parties to conflict, i.e., institutional armed forces, paramilitary groups,
drug traffickers, insurgent guerilla forces and other forms of private
violence.
Fourth, all these transformations took place during a time when drug
trafficking caused profound changes in Colombian society. Drug money
gave rise to the reconfiguration of the economy, society and politics,
while providing the means for the expansion of both guerilla and
paramilitary groups. 46 Finally, the international context changed and
modified the insertion of Colombia in the global dynamic. On the one

45. GYSTAvo GALLON, LA ARBITRARIEDAD MESURADA (1989).

46. Rodrigo Uprimny, Narcotrafico, Regimen Politico, Violencia y Derechos Humanos en
Colombia, in REVISTA DEL COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS CRIMINALISTAS DEL VALLE 29-30 (1994).
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hand, the processes of economic restructuring associated with
globalization have led to the modification of the Colombian economic
growth model in the direction of neoliberalism. These changes started
taking shape during the Barco administration (1986-1990) and were
consolidated during the Gaviria administration (1990-1994). On the
other hand, the U.S. pressure on Colombia increased in many areas, as
the war on drugs obtained greater international importance during the
Reagan and the first Bush administrations. In addition, with the end of
the Cold War, the alleged threat posed by drug trafficking and
organized crime started to play the ideological role that the communist
threat had played before. This led the United States to reconsider its role
in global politics and to reevaluate its ties with its traditional allies,
including Colombia.
The combined effect of these factors has provoked a growing
institutional and economic instability. Consequently, Colombia faces a
deep governance crisis and, since the 1980s, has entered into a turbulent
and uncertain phase. Diverse strategies have been developed to deal
with these problems. In some periods, the politics of authoritarian
control of the public order have been favored, through ample
concessions of power to the military and strong restrictions on human
rights. At other times, the processes of political openness and
negotiation with the insurgent groups have been attempted. Within this
context, the 1990 election of a Constitutional Assembly with the
purpose of writing a new constitution that would reestablish and
legitimize the political order in Colombia was of particular importance.
The Assembly had a very pluralist composition as shown by the
participation of not only members of the traditional parties, but also
demobilized guerillas and representatives of social and religious groups
traditionally excluded from Colombian politics, like indigenous groups
and religious minorities. The Assembly also introduced important
political and institutional innovations.
Nevertheless, the war continued because only a few guerilla groups
turned over their guns and incorporated into civil life. Moreover, during
the Samper administration (1994-1998), Colombia faced a grave
political crisis, which was unleashed by accusations that the Cali Cartel
had contributed to the President's campaign and that of other
politicians.4 7 The effects of endemic violence and institutional
fragmentation have been compounded during the current Pastrana

47. See generally TRAS LAS HUELLAS DE LA CRISIS POLITICA (Francisco Leal-Buitrago ed.,
1996).
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administration (1998-2002) by the unleashing of a deep economic
recession and the continuation of the civil war, despite the
government's efforts at promoting a negotiation with the major guerrilla
groups. It is within this complex social and political setting that the
historical characteristics and recent transformations of the Colombian
judicial apparatus must be understood.
Summing up, four basic obstacles challenge the good intentions of
the current constitution, to such an extent that not even a strong
constitutional court, or highly qualified judges, could turn things
around. The first is the current armed conflict. It is very difficult for a
constitution, by itself, to pacify a country at war. Peace is foremost a
political fact, and as long as it is not achieved, war will severely limit
the constitution. Of course, the existing constitution - or a new one
could contribute to bringing about a peace agreement, but by
themselves, constitutions can do little to establish peace.
The second factor is the existence of a political system driven by
inherited family ties and clientelism. A constitution needs a solid
political system for its norms to be developed by the people's
representatives in Congress. A constitution can do little by itself to
bring about this functioning system of representation, which depends
not only on clear sanctions and political incentives, but also on a culture
of political participation. It is true that the 1991 Constitution left a lot to
be desired in the area of political reform, and, therefore, a better set of
norms on this topic should have been expected from the constituent

assembly. However, I doubt that the bulk of the vices of our political
class could have been eradicated even through improved normative
arrangements in the constitution.
The third factor is the existence of sharp social inequalities. Our
society is still in many ways a feudal one, where social marginalization
means that people are also excluded from the legal order, from judicial
activity, and from obtaining their rights. As long as this social
inequality is not overcome, it is a mere illusion to expect the rights
inscribed in the constitution to be perfectly applied. In this sense, the
ideas of Rousseau maintain their validity: "Regarding equality . . . no
citizen should possess such opulence that he may buy another, or no
citizen should be so poor that he is obligated to sell himself.""
Finally, a fourth factor lays out the pervasiveness of a global system
that hinders the capability of national legal systems to bring about social
changes. In general terms, globalization is an obstacle to social change
48. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EL CONTRATO SOCIAL 51 (1993).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

19

Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 13
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

\52

{Vol.

16

in Latin America to the extent that it primarily promotes inequalities
and triggers social marginalization. 49 "In a world increasingly
dominated by globalized forms of power and of unequal exchanges, the
prospects for democracy will heavily depend on the possibility of
democratizing global interactions and social relations," explains
Santos.5` More specifically the subjugation of state policies to foreign
interests converts the constitution into mere paper-law. This is apparent
in the area of criminal public policy, and particularly in all subjects

related to drug trafficking, where Colombia seems to have been a nation
under the scrutiny of the international community. I do not mean to say
that the constitution has no effect in these areas; I am simply saying that
these are political, cultural and economic realities which are difficult to
modify by decree and that constitutions by themselves can do little to
change them.
It is highly probable that these negative factors would be further
exacerbated if the 1886 Constitution were still in effect. Without a
doubt, problems in the judicial system, for example, would have been
more severe if the writ of protection (tutela) had not been adopted.
Meanwhile,; the constitutional court has mitigated some of the
disadvantages inherent to our constitutionalism of expectations, above
all its tendency to turn constitutional texts into mere symbolic
declarations. 1 These improvements, however, are clearly insufficient.
The gap between constitutional postulates and social realities has
expanded rather than contracted. Although the Constitution of 1991
seems to be a necessary step towards solving national problems, it is
probably insufficient on its own. The debate about its implementation,
reform or substitution - which has begun to surface - should always
be linked to the problems that the social and political context creates for
its application.

49. See, e.g., DAVID HELD & ANTHONY McGREw, THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER

(2000).
50. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law andDemocracy: (Mis)trustingthe Global Reform of

Courts, in GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS, CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION AND INNOVATION 271 (J. Jenson
& Boaventura de Sousa Santos eds., 2000).
51. Rodrigo Uprimny, Constituci6nDe 1991 EstadoSocial YDerechos Humanos: Promesas

Incumplidas, Diagn6sticos YPerspectivas, in LA CONSTITUCION DE 1991 (ILSA ed., 2001).
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III. CONCLUSION

My proposal in this Article is to suggest that Colombia needs an
aspirational constitution, as do the other countries in Latin America. We
must remain conscious of the context in which this constitutionalism is
being applied and the gap that separates it from present day reality.
What we need, then, is something like a realist or a contextual
aspirational constitutionalism. By this I mean that the constitutions of

societies that are dissatisfied with their present day realities must be
based on expectations. An attempt must be made, to the degree that it is
possible, to exorcise the dangers inherent to this type of

constitutionalism, keeping in mind two things: first, the expectations
must be capable of being fulfilled in order to avoid the
counterproductive effects of symbolic legitimacy; and second, the
expectations must be grounded in a "militant constitution,"" a
constitutionalism that actively brings social actors and political
representatives to the task of making effective the constitutional
postulates. Not only do I believe that the constitution should be
supported by the political forces that brought it about, but those political
forces must persist in efforts to establish the social conditions that make
it possible for the constitution to be applied.
A good aspirational constitutionalism is one that narrows the gap
between desires and realities and, in this way, ends up being a strong
constitutionalism of protection, or in other words, a constitutionalism
which aims to guarantee rights in the present. It is a constitutionalism
that, through its very application and fulfillment, creates its own
antidote to its shortcomings - an antidote that counters the inefficacy
of rights, authoritarian statist practices and the politicizing of reform. I
am aware of the fact that this might be seen as an eclectic solution, but I
know also that eclecticism has proven to be a fruitful attitude
throughout the history of constitutionalism. By outlining these ideas, I
do not mean to reduce the utopian character of constitutionalism of
expectations. These constitutions will continue to be like magic wands,
which do not work well except when people believe in them. In this
way, they exist like the placebo effect in medicine, which cures people
without actually possessing the physical capacity to do so.

52. This paraphrases Donald Komners' concept of "militant democracy" in relation to the
German Constitution. DONALD P. KOMNERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 222 (1989).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

21

154

Florida Journal of
International Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 13
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16

In this Article, I aimed at elucidating the political consciousness that
has brought us to the idea that our destiny depends on having a good
constitution. Perhaps this exercise will help us think more clearly about
the coming process of constitutional change in Latin America.
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